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There are two players: Player 1 and Player 2.
Before the game begins, each player pays into the pot, so the initial pot is
The deck contains exactly three cards:
with ranking
Player 1 receives one card, Player 2 receives one card, and the third card is set aside.
Both players may look at their own card.
Player 1 acts first.
Player 1's action
Player 1 may:
• bet, which means adding exactly to the pot; or
• check, which means adding nothing.
Player 2's action
After seeing Player 1's action, Player 2 may:
• fold, immediately giving the current pot to Player 1; or
• follow, meaning Player 2 matches Player 1's total contribution.
Therefore:
• if Player 1 bet, Player 2 must add another to follow;
• if Player 1 checked, following costs nothing additional because both players have already contributed their ante.
If Player 2 follows, the cards are revealed and the player with the higher card wins the pot.
Subproblem A
Find the optimal strategy for each player.
Subproblem B
Suppose Player 1 bluffs by betting with the Queen with probability
Suppose Player 2, when holding a King and facing a bet, follows with probability
Derive equations that make the relevant decisions indifferent, and solve for and .
Subproblem C
Using the optimal strategies, find Player 1's expected net value per hand.